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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
"NO ACTION" CLAUSES IN INIYEMNITY INSURANCE
The earlier forms of contracts of indemnity insurance,
undertaking to protect the insured, were generally so
worded as to cause the courts little difficulty in discovering
therein an intent by the parties that the responsibility of
the insurers should arise as soon as the insured was sub-
jected to legal liability for the injury he had inflicted, i. e.
when the amount and rightfulness of the claim against the
insured had been established in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and, it was generally held that it was not
necessary that such liability should first have been dis-
charged by the insured.'
Today there exist two forms of insurance, commonly
called indemnity and liability insurance. The distinction
arises, as a general rule, by virtue of the provisions and
nature of the insurer's undertaking. However, frequently
the word "indemnity" is used inaccurately by way of con-
trast to "liability" to distinguish the two types of policies
which today are the subject of much discussion, and which
are in reality both strict indemnity policies.
2
The liability of the insurer accrues differently under
the terms of differing contracts. When the agreement of
the insurer is to pay "all damages with which the insured
may be legally charged, or be required to pay, or for which
he may become legally liable," it is clear the insurer can be
required to pay as soon as the liability of the insured be-
comes legally determined. The insurer is not concerned
137 A.L.R. 645.
224 Columbia Law Review 173, 175 (1924); American Employer's
Liability Ins. Co. v. Fordyce, 62 Ark. 562, 569, 36 S.W. 1051, 1053
(1896); McBride v. Aetna Ins. Co., 26 Ark, 528, 532, 191 S.W. 5, 6,
(1917); 37 A.L.R. 644; 80 University of Penna. L.R. 195; Malley v.
American Indemnity Co., 297 Pa. 216 (1929).
8American Employer's Liability Ins. Co. v. Fordyce, 62 Ark. 562,
36 S.W. 1051 (1896); Anoka Lumber Co. v. Casualty Co., 63 Minn.
286, 65 N.W. 353, 30 L.R.A. 689 (1895); Honen v. Assurance Corp.,
93 Wis. 201, 67 N.W. 46, 32 L.R.A. 388 (1896); Bains v. Atkins, 181
Mass. 240, 63 N.E. 414, 57 L.R.A. 791 (1902); Seeberger v. Wyman,
118 Iowa 527, 79 N.W. 290 (1899); Stephens v. Penna. Casualty Co.,
135 Mich. 189, 97 N.W. 686 (1903); Fritchie v. Miller's Penna. Ex-
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with the question whether the insured has paid or can pay
the judgment entered against him. The amount of the
liability, when so fixed, determines the measure of the in-
surer's liability to pay, provided, of course, it does not ex-
ceed the sum written in the policy. Thus, in an Arkansas
case,' a certain woman had secured a judgment for per-
sonal injury against a street railway company, which had
liability insurance containing a term whereby the insurer
agreed to pay all damages with which the insured might
be legally charged. The railway company was insolvent
and wholly unable to pay the judgment, but the receiver
nevertheless demanded of the insurer payment of the
amount of the judgment. This demand was contested by
the insurer on the grounds that the insurance contract
could only be for indemnity, and that, since the insolvent
insured had not been damnified by the judgment in ques-
tion, it ought not to ask to be indemnified. But the court
held the insurer liable for the full amount of the judgment,
clearly stating its reasons for so doing as follows: "This
is not simply a contract of indemnity. It is more. It is also
a contract to pay liabilities. The difference between a con-
tract of indemnity and one to pay legal liabilities is: Upon
the former an action cannot be brought, and a recovery
had, until the liability is discharged; whereas, upon the
latter, the cause of action is complete when the liability
attaches ...... "
In Frye v. Bath Gas & Electric Co.- the insurer had
contracted to indemnify the insured 'ifor loss actually sus-
tained and paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment after
trial of the issue." A judgment for a large amount was re-
covered against the insured employer for personal injuries
that came within the terms of the insurer's policy. The
tract Co., 197 Pa. 401, 47 Atl. 351 (1900); Klotzbach v. Bull Dog Auto
F. Ins. Ass'n, Mo. App. , 267 S.W. 39 (1924) ; Capelle v. U. S. Fidel-
ity & G. Co., 80 N.H. 481, 120 AtI. 556 (1922); Ross v. American Em-
ployer's Liability Ins. Co., 56 N.J.E. 41, 38 Atl. 22 (1897); See also
37 A.L.R. 645, for a list of the more recent cases upon this point.
4American Employer's Liability Ins. Co. v. Fordyce, 62 Ark. 562,
36 S.W. 1051 (1896).
597 Me. 241, 54 AtL 395, 59 L.R.A. 444.
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insured, however, had become insolvent, and an execution
issued against it was returned unsatisfied. The plaintiff
then filed his bill against the insured, its assignees, the in-
surer, and the parties in interest, praying that the insurer
be compelled to pay in satisfaction of his judgment the
amount due under the employer's liability policy. But the
court held, aside from the question whether the plaintiff
had any rights in the premises, that no payment was due
under the insurer's contract until the insured had sustained
some actual loss by making actual payment under the
judgment. But as the insured was wholly unable ever to
discharge its liability to the plaintiff, the insurer had in-
curred no liability whatever. "There can be no reimburse-
ment," said the court, "where there has been no loss. The
contract of insurance contains nothing to show that it was
the object or intention of the contracting parties that the
insurer should guaranty the gas company's liability for
negligence to its employees. It was not a contract of in-
surance against liability, but of indemnity against loss by
reason of liability."
6
In a New Jersey case 7 the court, construing a provision
identical with that in the case just discussed, held that,
while "not the amount of the employee's judgment, but the
amount paid by the employer thereon, was the sum for
which the insurer was responsible," yet a transfer of the
employer's- property to a trustee in bankruptcy was a
sufficient payment to satisfy the terms of the policy and
perfect the liability of the insurer. Only such a propor-
tion of the judgment was held payable, however, as cor-
responded to the percentage of all the assets of the insolv-
ent, excluding the insurance claim, to all the debts, exclud-
ing this judgment. Such an amount the insurer was re-
quired to pay to the receiver for the use of the complainant.
The distinction between the two is very well expressed
in a recent Pennsylvania case," where the late Justice Sad-
$See, to the same effect, Cushman v. Puel Co., (Iowa) 93 N.W.
509 (1904).
7Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Moses, 63 N.J.E. 260, 49 Atl. 720.
8Malley v. American Indemnity Co., 297 Pa. 216 (1929),
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ler says, "There are two types of indemnity insurance,
sometimes called indemnity against liability or 'liability'
contracts and indemnity against damage or 'indemnity' con-
tracts. In the first class, the liability of the insured de-
termines enforceability; in the other the policy is only en-
forceable when the insured has sustained actual loss, as by
paying a judgment against him coming within the scope
of the policy."9
The Pennsylvania courts have recognized the indem-
nity theory and have said upon numerous occasions 0 that
there can be no recovery against the insured until a loss
has actually been sustained, as by the payment of a judg-
ment. Thus the courts have adhered to the distinction
which arises between "indemnity" and "liability" insurance.
The difference in the two forms has been criticized by
various writers because it is claimed that there is no dis-
tinction between loss and liability and that loss is sustained
not only by having paid a judgment. If the term "loss" is
strictly interpreted it would indicate that if one is insolvent
so that he is unable to pay his debts or the judgment
against him, he can no longer suffer a loss. In an Okla-
homa case 1 it was well said, "In our judgment it is faulty
reasoning which leads to the conclusion that one can suffer
no loss if he is unable to pay that which he is under an
obligation to pay. Many modern business men, we dare
say, would deem the loss of money insignificant compared
to the loss of good name, not to mention the other losses
9See also: Rose & Sons Inc. v. Zurich Gen. Acc. Co., 296 Pa.
206 (1929); Fritchie v. Miller's Pa. Extract Co. 197 Pa. 401 (1901);
Md. Casualty Co. v. Peppard, 157 Pac. 160 (Oki. 1915); Harrison v.
Transit Co., 192 N.C. 545, 135 S.E. 460 (1926); Wicher v. Happach,
73 U.S. 94, 99.
10Rose & Sons, Inc. v. Zurich Gen. Acc. Co., 296 Pa. 206, at 209,
Mr. Justice Kephart :--"No right of action accrues, in a simple con-
tract of indemnity, until the indemnitee has suffered a loss against
which the covenant runs. The part protected cannot recover until
he has actually been damnified."; Pfeiler v. Penn Allen Portland
Cement Co., 240 Pa. 468 (1913); West v. MacMillan, 301 Pa. 344
(1930); Malley v. American Indemnity Co., 297 Pa. 216 (1929).
1 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppard, 157 Pac. 108 (Oki. 1915).
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which inevitably follow inability to meet honest obliga-
tions."
The Pennsylvania courts have shown their inclination
toward this view in the most recent decisions upon this
point."2 In the earliest one of these cases, the late
Mr. Justice Sadler said, "Loss does not have an in-
flexible meaning and may consist of many different situa-
tions of varying gradations. Voluntary or involuntary sep-
aration from one's money is not the only criterion of loss.
Any shrinkage in value of estate or property may on prop-
er occasions be rightfully so termed. Any depreciation or
depletion of property value through judicial sale or other-
wise would likewise come within the definition; the con-
crete result of these factors as it affects the owner is a
loss."
The latter one of these cases is an exemplification of
the adoption by the Pennsylvania courts of this theory of
"loss". It is said by the court, "A final judgment against an
individual was an actual as well as a potential loss within
the meaning of the terms of the policy."
The result is somewhat of a rebellion against the divi-
sion of indemnity insurance and the adoption of a view more
compatible with justice, doing away with the fallacious
view that there are two forms of indemnity as stated above.
The practical effect is to do away with "indemnity"
contracts and to make such contract always one of
indemnity against liability. The result which follows from
this is that a judgment against the insured would not have
to be paid before an action could be brought against the
insurer. The theory of subrogation would no longer stand
in the way as it does in the case of a contract of "indem-
nity" 14-that the insured cannot sue the insurer until he
has suffered loss. However, these two cases do not come
to this ultimate conclusion. They maintain the old rule
because of the fear which a court undergoes when it is
about to disturb precedent and thereby change the law,
12West v. MacMillan, 301 Pa. 344 (1930); Malley v. American
Indemnity Co., 297 Pa. 216 (1929).
i3U. S. Tube & Iron Co. v. Md. Casualty Co., 220 Pa. 42 (1907).
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and decide the case upon a different ground, leaving the
courts to decide, in the future, what the law will be.
The intention is so strong that it seems highly improbable
that the courts will not follow this lead set up by the late
Justice Sadler and carried on by Justice Kephart.
The next step taken by the insurance companies was
the insertion in the contract of the "no action" clause, i.e.,
a provision that "no action shall lie under this policy un-
less for the loss actually sustained and paid in satisfaction
of final judgment." One of the most perfect of these clauses
from the standpoint of the insurance company issuing the
policy reads as follows:
"No action shall lie against the company to recover
for any loss or expense under this policy, unless it shall
be brought by the assured for loss or expense actually
sustained and paid in money by him after the trial of
the issue."'"
It'seems that the reason this clause was inserted in the
policy by the insurance company was because the construc-
tion of many of the cases had been in favor of the indem-
nity against liability. This was so, even when the com-
pany undertook only to issue against loss from legal liabil-
ity.' 5
The popularity of this clause is due to the effect it had
upon the liability of the insurer; that the latter is not liable
to the insured until the judgment against him is paid.16 It
is clearly designed to make payment of the judgment after
trial a condition precedent 7 to the duty of the accident
company to indemnify the insured. We can therefore safe-
ly say that the intended effect of this clause is to relieve
the insurer of liability in a number of cases by placing a
construction upon this clause that will place the policy in
the category of one for indemnity as contrasted to one for
liability. All this tends toward the safety of the insurer,
-4Patterson v. Adan, 119 Minn. 308, 138 N.W. 281 (1912).
1537 A.L.R. 644 at 666.
' 6Cooley, Insurance, 5696.
'?Employers' Liability Assur. Co. v. Fredette, 3 D.L.R. 64, 66
(1923); 29 Rev. Leg. (N.S.) 93, 95 (1923).
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and as was said in a recent Maryland case, 18 "It may be
a surprise to many owners of automobiles to find that
policies such as we have before use do not afford them the
protection that they supposed they had; but however that
may be, we cannot change the contract between the parties
to meet the special circumstances, if the contracting par-
ties have not protected themselves." That this clause cre-
ates the effect of making the policy one of indemnity is
supported by much authority. 9
For twenty years the courts were blinded by this
clause, utterly failing to see the great injustice done by the
insurance company in the case of the insolvency of the in-
sured, in which event the injured person had no remedy
because the court said that there was no right of subroga-
tion until the judgment was actually paid.20 That there
was an injustice created by the "no action" clause there is
no doubt. In the case of insolvency the only one who de-
rived any benefit from the policy was the insurer. A per-
sonal judgment against the insured was of no benefit to
the injured person, it was not an asset in his hands. Any
hope of recovery upon it was frustrated by the financial
condition of the insured.2 1 Looking now at the position
of the insured, he is not in the position he was originally.
A judgment has been recovered against him which mars his
ability to obtain credit, therefore he has suffered a loss.
He cannot remove the judgment until he has paid the
amount of the obligation. Being unable to do this he is
not entitled to sue the insurer and recover it. Apparently
the only one who has gained anything is the insurer, who
should be the one to undergo the loss, having been paid
for the risk. This is well shown by the case cited previous-
'8London and Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. Cosgriff, 144 Md. 660,
125 Atl. 529, 532 (1924).
19See: 37 A.L.R. p. 647 citing authority from most of the states
in this country.
20Hollings v. Brown, 202 Ala. 504, 80 So. 792 (1919); Cushman v.
Carbondale Fuel Co., 122 Iowa 656, 98 N.W. 509 (1904); Burke v. Lon-
don Guaranty and Acc. Co., 47 Misc. 171, 93 N.Y., S. 652 (1905).
21See: 59 A.L.R. 1125.
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ly22 where no recovery was permitted against the insurer
because of the insolvency of the insured and his inability
to pay judgment obtained against him.
This is the status of the law in Pennsylvania as
shown by a comparatively recent decision .2  The injured
person prayed that he be subrogated to the rights of the
bankrupt employer under a "no action" policy which the
employer held. The court held that the injured person was
not entitled to subrogation to the rights of the bankrupt
employer against the insurance company, under an indem-
nity policy of accident insurance containing a "no action"
clause. The conclusion was arrived at with great brevity
it being a per curiam opinion. A court of justice should
not ignore the rights of the insured and the injured per-
son because of a principle of law, which may be sound
theoretically but practically unjust.
The case of United States Tube and Iron Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co. 2 ' is of the same opinion as the case just men-
tioned. The court said, in effect, that, where a policy of
indemnity contains a "no action" clause, an action brought
two days before the satisfaction of a judgment against the
insured is prematurely brought, and the insured cannot re-
cover thereon. This was also a per curiam opinion of
marvelous brevity.
This is in conformity with the majority view of this
country which is overwhelming. Following the case of
Malley v. American Indemnity Co.26 the most recent case on
this point 27 seems to hold with the majority view saying
that there will be no recovery from the insurance company
unless the judgment is actually paid. The facts of this
case were as follows: Plaintiff recovered a judgment for
personal injuries and issued an attachment summoning the
insurance company as garnishee. The company denied
2 Frye v. Bath Gas & Electric Co., 97 Me. 241, 54 Atl. 395 (1902)
28Pfeiler v. Penn Allen Portland Cement Co., 240 Pa. 468 (1913).
24220 Pa. 42 (1907).
25Endorsed by the following states: N. J., Ala., Iowa, Ky., Tenn.,
N. Y., Wash., Texas, Penna., Ohio, and others.
26297 Pa. 216 (1929).
2TWest vs. MacMillan, 301 Pa. 344 (1930).
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liability under the policy because the insured had not
actually paid the judgment against him. The policy con-
tained a "no action" clause in the usual form, but in addi-
tion there was a clause to the effect that the insurance
company would defend all actions brought against the
insured. It was held by the court, "Where a contract con-
tains a clause defining liability as being indemnity against
loss or damage arising or resulting from the happening of a
given event, the covenant of indemnity is not broken until
the indemnitee has suffered a loss against which the coven-
ant runs, and, generally speaking, an action cannot be sus-
tained until the liability is discharged by payment whether
before or after the final judgment."
"Where such a clause is followed by a clause provid-
ing that no action shall lie unless brought to recover money
actually paid, it does not change the meaning of indemnity;
the effect of the 'no action' clause is to rewrite what is
ordinarily understood by indemnity, except as it defines the
manner and time for payment."
"Where an indemnity contract contains provisions by
which the absolute control and determination of the loss
may be taken from the indemnitee by the company's assum-
ing entire charge of the defense, the company waives its
right to insist on a literal enforcement of the indemnity
contemplated by the contract, and an action may be sus-
tained by the indemnitee when the loss has been determined
by final judgment."
The case also contains interesting dictum to this ef-
fect, "It was shown by the Malley case, how a final judg-
ment against an individual was an actual as well as a
potential loss within the meaning of that term in the
policy."
As the actual ruling of the case is clearly expressed
there is no doubt that at the present the court is still fol-
lowing the rule presented by the Pfeiler case.2s The doubt
as to what might be the ruling in the future is presented
by the dictum in the West case, by Mr. Justice Kephart.
It seems clear that the confusion of the majority of the
28Pfeiler v. Penn Allen Portland Cement Co., 240 Pa. 468 (1913).
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courts is caused by the distinction between liability and
loss. In a recent article 9 it is said, "Nothing is more
obvious than that the traditional distinction is as formal
as it is artificial. In this modern commercial age, when
credit is the very essence of a commercial enterprise, to
assert that a liability is not a loss is to exemplify the sub-
tlety of the sophist."' If the distinction between loss and
liability is taken away it shatters the foundation of the
two forms of insurance, therefore leaving only one to exist;
namely, that of indemnity against liability. Unfortunately
the court did not make this step so necessary toward ad-
vancement but it is hoped that in the future the courts
will adopt this dictum and adopt the ruling more in line
with justice.
In addition to the "no action" clause was the reserva-
tion to the insurer of the right to defend all actions. The
court held that the strict indemnity contract was modified
by these subsequent acts, 31 and an action might be sustain-
ed by the indemnitee when the loss has been determined
by final judgment. It was held to be a policy of indemnity
against liability 2 Although this is the minority view it
seems to be the rising opinion of the courts in this country
and is displacing the view of the majority.
The theory of estoppel is explained by a New Hamp-
shire court" in this manner: "If 'to defend' means 'to pro-
tect', to secure against attachment, in short, to successfully
2980 University of Penna. Law Rev., p. 215-Laube.
30For the reason the distinction is the cause of the injustice, etc.,
see 80 U. of P. Law Rev., 215.
31Malley v. American Indemnity Co. 297 Pa. 216 (1929); Moses v.
Ferel and Indemnity Co. of America, 97 Pa. Super. Ct. 13 (1928);
Patterson v. Adan, 119 Minn., 308, 138 N.W. 281 (1912).
32Patterson v. Adan, 119 Minn. 308, 138 N.W. 281 (1912); Sand-
ers v. Frankfort Ins. Co., 72 N.H. 485, 57 A.L.R. 655 (1904); Elliot v.
Belt Automobile Ass'n, 87 Fla. 545, 100 So. 797 (1924); Md. Casualty
Co., v. Peppard, 157 Pac. 160 (Okl. 1915); Davies v. Md. Casualty
Co., 89 Wash. 571, 155 Pac. 1035 (1916); Picket v. Fidelity Co., 60 S.
C. 477, 38 S.E. 160; American Employer's Liability Insurance Co. v.
Fordyce, 62 Ark. 562, 36 S.W. 1051 (1896); Kephey v. Casualty
Ass'n of America, 355 Mich. 408, 238 N.W. 239 (1931).
23Sanders v. Frankfort Ins. Co., 72 N.H. 485, 57 AtL 655 (1904).
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defend, it is perfectly clear that the insurance company
agrees to perform their covenant of indemnity against loss
by assuming the liability and that payment by the insured
was not a condition precedent."
The weight of authority construes "to defend" as
meaning merely to contest the suit to final judgment.
While in a technical sense to defend a suit is to contest it,
the words "to defend" also include the broader meaning
suggested by the New Hampshire court.
The Pennsylvania court 3' says "The insurer has
safeguarded its own interest by ascertaining through legal
channels that a fair loss has been sustained; by its own
conduct at the trial, it is estopped from denying its own
liability and cannot prevent the indemnitee from recover-
ing, though the indemnitee's liability has not been dis-
charged by payment." This is not new in the Pennsylvania
law, it having been asserted previously.3 5 Under this
theory, the court in the West case said, in reference to the
"'no action" clause, "It is the joker of the policy and has
been written out by many legislatures."
We may then conclude that the West case does not
change the law in Pennsylvania but merely supplies dictum
that, if followed in the future, will render a "no action"
clause one of indemnity against liability as contrary to
indemnity against damages.
The necessity of legislation upon this point is urgent.
It should be the duty of the Assembly of Pennsylvania to
legislate upon this subject and safeguard this judicious
trend set in motion by the two recent cases, as the courts
in the future might stay this movement toward advance-
ment.
Adolph D. Weiss.
INJURIES ON GOLF COURSES
The rule seems to be without doubt in Pennsylvania
that to maintain an action for damages for an injury
8 4West v. MacMillan, 301 Pa. 344 (1930).
"5Malley v. American Indemnity Ins. Co., 297 Pa. 216 (1929).
